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Much of the economic insight gained over the past
several hundred years was derived under the basic
premise that individuals (also referred to as economic
agents) are self-interested and take actions, which—at
least subjectively—maximize utility, subject to the
constraints implied by any agent’s limited means
and/or bounded rationality, as well as by the environment he (or she) lives in. Indeed, even today, in a substantially more complex society and economy, constrained maximization of goal achievement under uncertainty remains a strong predictor and explanatory
force for the actual behavior of economic agents. Yet
agents’ choices are quite sensitive to the information
available to them, unless they “choose” to be selectively ignorant. The contributions contained in the
2021 edition of our longstanding SITES mini-track illustrate insights derived under the classical premise of
self-interest, in the context of a “new economy,”
where information—its generation, control, and strategic use—presents a key asset. The selection of research papers cluster within four main themes: rentseeking, collective perception and action, incomplete
information, and communication. Each of the four topics features three papers dedicated to one of these
themes, now examined in turn.

Data Ownership Empowerment Welfare-Enhancing?”
by Shilei Li and Juan Feng. Online platforms may be
able to earn rents from consumer data, such as through
aggregation or resale, and they need to provide incentives and compensation to get the data, quite likely in
the presence of other firms competing for the attention
and loyalty of the same customer base. Next up is
“Collaborative Innovation (or Not?!) When Product
Performance is Critical,” by Thomas A. Weber. Here
rent-seeking occurs through an innovation race between different firms. It turns out that if instead of
competing they collaborate at the innovation stage,
then—quite unsurprisingly—under the rent dissipation postulate—the investment in innovation actually
decreases, thus resulting generically in lower-quality
products than without the horizontal research collaboration. The final presentation, on “Should We Outlaw
Ransomware Payments?” by Debabrata Dey and
Atanu Lahiri, looks at illegal rent extraction by ransomware producers, examining the merits of regulatory interventions which would restrict the transfer of
rents to illegal elements by altogether disallowing ransom payments.

1. Rent-Seeking

In a society where physical displacement of individuals is limited (e.g., due to pandemics or by the mere
fact that purchases are more comfortable online than
in a brick-and-mortar store), high-quality information
is of the essence. This also applies to the delegation of
activities. We mention the latter specially, for the second session, on Collective Perception and Action—
Crowdsourcing, Contests, and Start-up Finance, starts
by looking at the well-known delegation problem between investors and managers of a firm, here in the
particularly intermediated setting of crowdfunding.
Michael Wessel, Rob Gleasure, and Robert J. Kauffman discuss “Creators and Backers in Rewards-Based
Crowdfunding: Will Incentive Misalignment Affect
Kickstarter’s Sustainability?” They show that managing the incentive misalignment between investors and
innovators in crowdfunding platforms is a fundamentally dynamic process, which stands to benefit greatly
from endogenously-generated public information that
has a “normalizing” function, producing better common knowledge and thus more trustful behavior on all

As pointed out initially, for most practical purposes it
is safe to assume that economic agents are self-interested. As Tullock [1] pointed out, they therefore constantly engage in behavior that aims at extracting excess returns from others, the so-called rents. Secondary activities which are undertaken to enable this rent
extraction are referred to as rent-seeking. While this
may perhaps sound over-technical and schoolmasterly
for a light introduction to a mini-track, what appears
interesting is that rent-seeking activities are costly, and
that agents are willing to spend—at least collectively—as much on getting rents as these rents themselves are worth. This is precisely Posner’s rent dissipation postulate [2], which essentially implies that in
a competitive setting agents are willing to burn the
rents that they stand to gain, thus preventing others and
themselves(!) from actually getting them. With this in
mind, the first session, on Rent-Seeking—Private
Data, Innovation, and Ransomware, opens with “Is
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2. Collective Perception and Action
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sides. The disclosure of social information related to
project outcomes is examined in “Does Exposure to
Shared Solutions Lead to Better Outcomes? An Empirical Investigation in Online Crowdsourcing Contests” by Jingbo Hou, Pei-Yu Chen and Bin Gu. A
crowdsourcing platform (or rather a firm participating
on one side) can use the competitive rent-seeking concept productively to its advantage by eliciting ideas
and innovation (on the other side of the platform) via
crowdsourcing contests. Just as disclosure of patents
can have a stimulating and quality-enhancing effect on
innovation in a society, the sharing of solutions with
other participants on the platform can have positive
externalities, resulting in higher-quality innovative
output down the line. The last paper, “A Scaling Perspective on AI Start-ups,” by Matthias Schulte-Althoff, Daniel Fürstenau and Gene Moo Lee, is concerned with the shallowness of collective perception
and the consequences of hype. Their empirical work
finds evidence for the fact that start-up firms in artificial intelligence (AI) may benefit from thematic-hype
externalities with superlinear funding (as a function of
company size), whereas—quite in contrast—AI revenue growth proves to be merely sublinear, just as in an
average service business. This calls to mind the classic
insight by John Maynard Keynes that the valuation of
firms is like a beauty contest where investors collectively agree on which firm should show promise [3,
Ch. 12], at times irrespective of its fundamentals.

Information is especially important when investments
under uncertainty are irreversible. Just as credible signals are particularly useful for long (and thus less reversible) jobs, quality information is important in industries where investments are large, such as in real
estate. Eric K. Clemons and Stina Teilmann-Lock’s
work on “Fundamentals for the Design of Products for
a Circular Economy: Examples from Software Engineering to Motivate Efficient and Ethical Design of
Physical Products” examines the real-option value of
modularity and flexibility; see also [4]. The wellknown equivalence of flexibility and information, as
established by Weisbrod [5], implies a substantial
value of flexibility whenever information about the
critical unknown facts is desirable. The session closes
with a paper by Jan Fell, Galit Shmueli, Travis Greene,
Jyun-Cheng Wang, and Soumya Ray on “Seeing Humans in the Data: Ethical Blind Spots of Taiwan Academic Researchers in the Era of Behavioral Big Data.”
This turns our view toward human resistance to information, when deemed unnecessary (by them), inconvenient, or simply in excess. The authors find that
mandatory ethics training (assuming information is actually imparted in such a session) may not help with
removing ethical blind spots, thus in effect highlighting the existence of a chosen ignorance, perhaps somewhat due to Herbert Simon’s insight that attention is in
fact a scarce resource, 1 resulting more recently in a
theory of rational inattention [7].

3. Incomplete Information

4. Communication

The third session shifts our focus to Incomplete Information—Signals, Options, and Ignorance, in three settings which are quite different from one another. The
first paper, by Abhishek Kathuria, Terence Saldanha,
Mariana Andrade Rojas, Sunil Mithas and Hyeyoung
Hah on “Inferring Supplier Quality in the Gig Economy: The Effectiveness of Signals in Freelance Job
Markets,” is an empirical study of labor market signaling. In a market with asymmetric information, agents
are trying to send costly signals (e.g., education) to
“prove” that their skills are sufficiently high to be
hired. The authors find that signals such as skill and
achievement do actually help with matching at an
online job platform, at least when jobs require commitment (i.e., take sufficiently long to complete)
and/or cultural distance is large. This may perhaps imply that a small cultural distance can be somewhat of
a substitute for a lack of information about a person’s
skill level.

When information is available for human consumption, it needs to be communicated—through words,
signals, and actions. And this year’s SITES mini-track
therefore concludes with a session on Communication—Service, Meta-Feedback, and Content Morphing. The first paper, on “Chronic Complainers or Increased Awareness? The Dynamics of Social Media
Customer Service,” by Shujing Sun, Yang Gao and
Huaxia Rui, finds that the provision of service to some
signals its availability to others, so that—perhaps
somewhat counterintuitively—offering service help
leads to an increased demand for service. Naturally,
the authors also find that this demand eventually decreases when the quality of the service is sufficiently
high. The second paper, by Warut Khern-am-nuai and
Yinan Yu, is entitled “Are Review Helpfulness Score
and Review Unhelpfulness Score Two Sides of the
Same Coin or Different Coins?” It shows, just as
Tversky and Kahneman [8] demonstrated for gains
versus losses, that framing matters in communication.

1 “What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of in-

formation creates a poverty of attention, and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of
information sources that might consume it” [6, pp. 40/41].
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Here the authors show that respondents to helpfulness
and unhelpfulness scores differ systematically, a fact
that does not surprise us much—as it is rooted in our
asymmetric perception of positive versus negative
feedback, driven by evolution. The sensitivity to negative stimuli – a negativity effect [9] – is substantially
larger than human perceptiveness of positive signals.
In a modern context, the latter may be reinforced by
the ubiquitous “social sugar-coating” of one’s actual
feelings, leading to an excess of positive messaging.
The final contribution is by Kelvin King, Bin Wang
and Diego Escobari on the “Effects of Sentiments on
the Morphing of Falsehoods and Correction Messages
on Social Media.” Here the authors examine the influence of personal feelings on the cosine-distance of
messages as they get re-communicated on social media. One could think of this phenomenon as the addition of “social noise” on social media. This would naturally limit the capacity of information transmission
on the inexpensive social channel to a corresponding
social Shannon capacity; see [10] for the classical notion.

5. Concluding Thoughts
What shall the reader take away from the authors’ contributions and our rather meandering thoughts, which
we applied rather loosely as if by some “sticky tape”
(in this “mini-track introduction”) …? We would like
to think that the sum is larger than its parts. Collectively, the authors shed light, from different angles and
recesses, onto the agents’ self-interest, which is in itself colored by imperfections. That is, the agents themselves are only imperfectly self-interested, leading to
a social component of interactions that might be
viewed as an element of bounded rationality (in the
form of a constraint in the utility-maximization problem) when trying to continue to hang on to the classical paradigm of self-interest. Or, it may simply indicate that individuals are not all driven by adversarial
self-interest, but also by a mutual “selves”-interest in
the face of societal challenges, such as pandemics,
overpopulation, and the (all too obvious) environmen-

tal degradation. These external constraints, as they become increasingly binding, are starting to align behavior, so that individuals are seemingly beginning to deviate from the neoclassical paradigm (at least when focusing on only a portion of their purview). For example, what explains the concern about sustainability that
people “suddenly” exhibit—their participation in
crowdsourcing, micro-finance, or social feedback
mechanisms? It is perhaps a shared awareness that life
on our planet is limited and that the common external
constraints imply the need for greater harmonization
in the socialization of behavior, ideally greased by
ubiquitous information transparency.
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